The United States Antiboycott Law and Other Export Controls by Hunt, Cecil
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
VOLUME 14 1984 IssuE 3
THE UNITED STATES ANTIBOYCOTT LAW
AND OTHER EXPORT CONTROLS
Cecil Hunt*
I approach an occasion like this thinking that perhaps I should
come equipped with a mask from ancient theatre so I could flip to
one side and show my benign visage as a trade promoter and then
quickly flip to the other side to show the scowl of the regulator and
the enforcer. It is true that both roles are combined in my job; it is
true that both are combined in the International Trade Adminis-
tration in the Department of Commerce, where I provide legal
counsel; and it is true that this split personality, schizophrenia if
you will, runs through the Executive Branch as a problem in man-
aging the separation of powers. This confusion of Executive roles is
part of the history of United States law and practice in dealing
with the regulation of international trade.
There has been over the decades a struggle for balance, a strug-
gle for balance of some very important competing interests. This
effort has involved the difficult task of trying to strike a balance
between the urge and necessity of increasing exports on the one
hand and the strong and vital interest in protecting national secur-
ity on the other. In recent years one side of that balance has in-
creasingly moved beyond traditional national security concepts to
the advocation of the use of export controls to achieve foreign pol-
icy interests. That development has been a difficult and compli-
cated component of the balance striking process.
I cannot accept the segmentation of this process by decades as
has been proposed, because the foreign policy export controls have
really been with us for twenty to thirty years in the form of the
embargoes against Cuba.1 These are foreign policy export controls;
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they are broad embargoes. They illustrate, I believe, another ingre-
dient of the problem with which our nation must cope. That prob-
lem is the tendency in our system toward accretion of controls, to-
ward the continuation, perhaps in some cases mindless
continuation, of controls beyond the circumstances that have given
them their birth. Congress attempted to deal with the growth of
regulation in the Export Administration Act of 19792 with a one-
year sunset provision on foreign policy based controls.3 The Ad-
ministration has now given the controls three years of almost com-
plete roll-over extension 4 and I, for one, am surprised at the degree
of tolerance that has been shown by the Administration in this
regard.
The battle for balance in this area is inherently colored by our
constitutional separation of powers. The President, with his pow-
lanation were originally issued at 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201-515.801 (1962), and those regulations
now appear at 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-515.809 (1984) as amended.
' Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2401-20 (1982). For review and criticism of the workings of the Act, see Evrard, The
Export Administration Act of 1979- Analysis of its Major Provisions and Potential Impact
on United States Exporters, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1982); Note, The Export Administra-
tion Act's Technical Data Regulations: Do They Violate The First Amendment?, 11 GA. J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 563 (1981); Comment, The Export Administration Act of 1979: Latest
Statutory Resolution of the "Right to Export" Versus National Security and Foreign Pol-
icy Controls, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255 (1981).
3 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(2) (1982).
' The President must use the criteria set out in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b)(1)(6) to deter-
mine whether to extend the controls past the one-year limit. The required considerations
are:
(1) the probability that such controls will achieve the intended foreign policy
purpose, in light of other factors, including the availability from other countries of
the goods or technology proposed for such controls;
(2) the compatability of the proposed controls with the foreign policy objectives
of the United States, including the effort to counter international terrorism, and
with overall United States policy toward the country which is the proposed target
of the controls;
(3) the reaction of other countries to the imposition or expansion of such export
controls by the United States;
(4) the likely effect of the proposed controls on the export performance of the
United States, on the competitive position of the United States in the interna-
tional economy, on the international reputation of the United States as a supplier
of goods and technology, and on individual United States companies and their
employees and communities, including the effects of controls on existing contracts;
(5) the ability of the United States to enforce the proposed controls effectively;
and
(6) the foreign policy consequences of not imposing controls.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e) requires the President to notify Congress of his find-
ings under this subsection and of his intent to extend controls.
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ers in the areas of both national defense and foreign relations,
must try to reach the correct balance between his assertions of in-
herent authority and his deference to the very explicit constitu-
tional grant of power to the Congress with respect to the enact-
ment of laws regulating the foreign commerce of the United States.
Another ingredient in the process, and one that I think is coming
more into focus once again, is the need to strike a balance between
various economic interests in our country. I would submit that
these interests are agriculture services and financial services on the
one hand versus domestic manufacturing on the other. The promo-
tion of either set of interests has been seen as bringing retaliation
against the other.
Another complex aspect of our system of export controls con-
cerns regulatory procedures or techniques. We must constantly in-
quire about the correct balance between the desire for predictabil-
ity and precision in regulations and the need in areas of diplomacy,
international relations, and national security for a fairly broad de-
gree of executive flexibility. Similar considerations are sometimes
thought to call for a reduced degree of transparency in the govern-
mental process.
The often uncertain and contentious distribution of Export Ad-
ministration Act functions and authorities among the Department
of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and the Department of
State, is another product of this difficult political process of trying
to reach an appropriate balance. Another speaker has correctly
cited a number of current issues on Capitol Hill that reflect the
continuation of this process. We are certainly going to continue to
have an export control structure, but we can hope to see it per-
fected in years to come.
Let me turn from these questions of balance to state what in my
view are the necessary ingredients of an appropriate export control
system. I believe there is a triad upon which a proper control sys-
tem should be based. One leg of the triad is the scope of controls.
We have seen over the last decade, for example, a well considered
attempt in the area of national security to narrow the focus of ex-
port controls. In the mid and late 1970's the so-called Bucy Report
gave expression to the concept that the focus of controls should
shift from end products to controls over the critical technologies
that could be used by potential adversaries to leap ahead in mili-
tary capability or to narrow the technological lead of the West.
The goals were to reduce the controls on end items, to concentrate
on those technologies that yield design and productive capacity,
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and to focus on keystone equipment which can be used for strate-
gically sensitive production.
This shift in emphasis gave rise in the 1979 Act to the concen-
tration of controls on militarily critical technologies.6 The statute
gave the Department of Defense the job of drawing up a list of
militarily critical technologies, which was then to be translated
into a new narrowed list of commodities and technologies to be
controlled for export. The process has floundered for many rea-
sons. It has floundered because of conceptual difficulties and be-
cause the need to define what is sensitive resulted in the classifying
of the Department of Defense's list so that it ceased to be a poten-
tial guide to exporters or export controllers. The control attempt
has also failed due to a lack of consensus and definition of what is
critical technology and what are our true national security goals. A
process initiated to focus controls, therefore, yielded instead a mil-
itarily critical technologies list that was gargantuan. Work contin-
ues in this area, and progress is being made, but much more work
remains. In any event, one leg of the triad is eventually going to be
the determination of the proper scope of the controls and their
translation into understandable and predictable terms to avoid
problems of vagueness and overbreadth.
The second element in the triad is the question of foreign availa-
bility, which is really a question of the effectiveness of controls. If
impact on the target country is our objective and the goods our
country seeks to control for national security or foreign policy pur-
poses are effectively available from other markets, our controls are
rendered ineffective. That situation "suggests two alternatives.
First, we could increase our efforts to reduce or eliminate foreign
availability where we are convinced that our vital interests require
effective controls; second, we could adopt mechanisms for reducing
or eliminating our controls where we perceive that they will be uni-
lateral and ineffective.
Again, Congress perceived the problem and in 1979 enacted
strong foreign availability provisions dealing with both the effort to
reduce foreign availability and the reduction of United States con-
trols when foreign availability persists.6 Very briefly, I would sug-
gest that some real progress has been made in the first branch of
that program, for in the last two to two and a one-half years there
I See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d) (1982). Subsection (d)(1) illustrates the mandate of Con-
gress "that export controls. . .are limited to militarily critical goods and technologies."
s See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f) (1982).
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have been significant advances in the area of cooperatively main-
tained national security controls. The United States has sought to
heighten the interest of foreign governments in the perfection of
the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(CoCom) process and in the operation of their domestic control
systems.7 This effort has not been without controversy, but there
have been advances. The United States full - court press to get its
allies to take some of these controls more seriously has not, to date
anyway, resulted in overloading the circuits of CoCom, and a
breakdown of what is properly characterized as a loosely struc-
tured "non-organization" has not occurred.
My reports cannot be sanguine concerning the second element of
the foreign availability leg of the three-legged stool. We have not
seen the dismantling of foreign policy controls or national security
controls on the basis of continued foreign availibility of controlled
products; neither have we witnessed as yet a real implementation
of the 1979 legislative mandate to increase the ability of the
United States export control system to determine and take into
account, both on a regulation by regulation basis and on an appli-
cation by application basis, the factor of foreign availability. Addi-
tional resources have been committed in the past six months to the
foreign availability assessment effort in the Department of Com-
merce, but it will take six to twelve months to take stock and see
what this increase in personnel means in terms of export control
actions.
The third leg of my triad is enforcement. If a government has
properly focused controls and has dealt with the effectiveness of
those controls by making them appropriately multilateral, it must
then assure that they are observed and enforced. Here other speak-
ers have probably conveyed my message better than I can convey it
myself. I think they have sent shivers through the audience in
describing the process of enforcement and have implied, if not ex-
pressly stated, that the enforcement desire is growing in intensity.
The theme of this Conference is "Exporting in the 80's", and
perhaps my main observation as to what is going to change in the
exporting climate for the 80's is that increased resources and in-
' CoCom is a 15-member "informal cooperative arrangement through which the United
States and its allies seek to coordinate the national controls they apply to the export of
strategic goods and technology to the Communist world." Hunt, Multilateral Cooperation
in Export Controls- The Role of CoCom, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1285, 1285-86 (1983). For more
information on CoCom, see Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Pre-
sent, and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 834-42 (1967).
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creased attention will be given to the enforcement of the export
control laws. When I came to the Department of Commerce some-
thing under five years ago, I was personally appalled at the low
level of enforcement activity with respect to the export control
laws. I use the term "low level" both because of the number of
administrative and criminal cases that were open and because the
cases were the kind that I would describe as "shooting fish in a
barrel." The people who slipped up in observing the regulations
were for the most part the people being pursued. The international
operators, meanwhile, who were deliberately compromising our se-
curity for their financial gain or their political interests were not
being effectively pursued.
This state of affairs is changing, at least to some extent. I cannot
say that good faith exporters are not still getting a great deal of
attention for what may be relatively minor slip-ups. I can say that
the level of criminal enforcement activity, the level of successful
criminal enforcement, and the resources devoted to going after the
real operators have all increased. Moreover, I suggest that from the
standpoint of the exporting community this increased enforcement
is a positive step. Growth in success in dealing with criminal and
deliberate control violations potentially can create the climate of
confidence in the Congress and in the Executive Branch that will
lead to support of measures to reduce some of the paperwork and
compliance burden on the exporting community. I suggest, further-
more, that tightly focused enforcement and successful enforcement
can go hand in hand with narrowed and tightly-focused export
controls.
I think the following comments will not be good for the organiza-
tion of my remarks, but I would like to flip the mask to the pro-
moter side and make just a few statements about the Export Trad-
ing Company (ETC) legislation.8 Let me say first, and my
comments are going to be brief, that the subject deserves more
time. Although I did work on the legislation and on early aspects
of its implementation, all ETC activity is now being handled in a
separate office.
My ETC comment relates to my general concern with striking
the right balance in government activities affecting exports. The
Department of Commerce, in close collaboration with the Depart-
ment of Justice, administers'the certification program under Title
I Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) (codified
in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 30 U.S.C.).
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III of the Export Trading Company Act 9 to give antitrust liability
protection to certain joint exporting and other export activities.
My comment is simply this. What has grown up in the Department
of Commerce just in the last year in implementing this new legisla-
tion is a process of consulting with the exporting companies and
advising them prior to their application for certification. The de-
partment advises exporters about the suitability of their proposed
activity for the certification process and the means of going about
obtaining certification. This pre-filing conference can actually in-
volve consultation on particular issues that might complicate an
application. The pre-filing consultation is quite different from
what many of you may have been exposed to if you have gone to
conferences around the nation at which there has been a fair
amount of simple drum beating about the program. This effort is
significant in that it is, in my view, representative of a dramatic
new move toward a cooperative approach. The contrast between
what is taking place now in this collaborative implementation of
the export trading company certification process and the business
review procedure of the antitrust division of the Department of
Justice, which some of you are familiar with, is dramatic. I am con-
fident that we shall see this mindset and approach transferred to
other aspects of exporting.
Another subject that I will lightly touch on because of time con-
straints is the anti-boycott program. I will provide further illustra-
tion of export control on ideas. This is truly a profound topic, how-
ever, that deserves much more attention than we will be able to
give it in the course of this conference. I come to the broad subject
of control on ideas through the anti-boycott statute0 in this way.
The anti-boycott law and the regulations under it broadly affect
activity by United States persons with respect to their activities in
the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States in three
ways. One way, the obvious one, involves prohibitions against dis-
criminatory conduct and refusal to do business, that is, implement-
ing a boycott in the classic sense. The second prohibits the furnish-
ing of certain information in response to a boycott request or
otherwise with the intent to comply with the boycott. An example
could be the sending of a copy of your company's 10K to a boycott
office in Damascus, Syria. The third element is the requirement of
reporting the receipt of boycott-related requests from foreign
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-21 (1982).
,o The anti-boycott statute is 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1982).
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authorities.
Concerning the second of these elements, the prohibitions on the
furnishing of information with the intent to comply with a boycott,
there were some early fundamental challenges brought in the
courts against the boycott statute and regulations."1 These chal-
lenges were grounded in a variety of constitutional assertions, in-
cluding claimed denials of substantive and procedural due process,
and a ninth amendment ground which neither I nor the courts
have ever fully understood.1 2 The principal attack, however, was on
first amendment free speech grounds, with opponents asserting
that these regulations were unconstitutional because they consti-
tuted a prior restraint on lawful speech by a citizen of the United
States. 3 The challengers in one case, for example, sought to sus-
tain the proposition that answering an Arab boycott questionnaire
would be fully privileged speech under the first amendment; they
argued that the questionnaire would in turn not be commercial
speech, to which a lesser degree of protection is provided." Plain-
tiffs maintained that the communication to boycott authorities
should be fully privileged speech, because it really was done in a
political context. They asserted that the companies sought to an-
swer the boycott questionnaire to get particular Arab nations to
change their practices, that is, to end or avoid blacklisting."
Let me just cut through this muddle to say that I am inspired to
refer to these cases because the Seventh Circuit just about three
weeks ago handed down the first decision at the appellate level and
upheld the boycott regulations against this challenge in two cases
consolidated on appeal. 6 The Seventh Circuit made short shrift of
the commercial speech suggestion, saying that it was clearly com-
mercial and not political speech because the object sought was sim-
" See Trane Co. v. Baldrige, 552 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (challenge based on
first, fifth, and ninth amendment rights); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige, 539 F. Supp.
1307, reconsideration denied, 544 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (challenge on first, fifth and
ninth amendment grounds).
1 In Trane, the plaintiffs asserted the statute violated their ninth amendment "funda-
mental right to correct misapprehensions by providing truthful information about them-
selves." Trane Co., 552 F. Supp. at 1390-91. The court rejected out of hand the plaintiff's
argument that such a right existed under the ninth amendment. Id.
iS See, e.g., Trane Co., 552 F. Supp. at 1385-88; Briggs & Stratton Corp., 539 F. Supp. at
1317-19; New Orleans Steamship Ass'n., 626 F.2d at 462-63.
" Briggs and Stratton Corp., 539 F. Supp. at 1317-19.
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ply to open the market to the company's products." The court
then applied the commercial speech standards established in a
number of recent Supreme Court cases and found that the regula-
tions served the significant governmental purpose of having per-
sons subject to United States jurisdiction effectively involved in,
manipulated, and made instruments of the fact-finding process of
the foreign boycott apparatus. 8 The court further found that the
regulations were reasonably designed to further that governmental
purpose and that they were not overbroad."
This decision on anti-boycott rules translates into the broader
concept of controls on ideas by providing just one more illustration
of the marked deference that the courts appear willing to give to
legislation and to executive action in the area of furthering na-
tional foreign policy and security interests.2 0 The courts are finding
it easier to expand the limits in that area because of a number of
principles that we will find, I predict, repeated in many future ad-
judications of export control cases. These cases can and will get to
court, whether or not Congress changes the Export Administration
Act exemption from judicial review.2' Significant evidence of defer-
ence to the Executive in the national security area exists. We see
such deference illustrated in United States v. Edler Industries,
Inc.,22 an export control case involving regulations on the export of
technical data.
The concept of nonjusticiability is present in other examples of
judicial deference to the Executive in the area of international
trade. The Executive is judged to be exercising foreign policy func-
tions and to have been given broad grants of authority under much
of the legislation in the trade area. This view has been applied, for
instance, to our negotiations under bilateral and multilateral tex-
tile arrangements. The actions taken by the Executive in pursuing
our international trade interests, even though they translate into
border limitations on the importation of textiles or other con-
" Briggs and Stratton Corp., 728 F.2d at 917-18.
1 Id.
1I Id.
20 The Supreme Court, for example, has held that "[i]n this vast, external realm (foreign
affairs), with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation." United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). "The courts may not so exercise
their jurisdiction. . .as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting
foreign relations." Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
21 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412 (1982).
22 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
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trolled products, may often be found to be nonjusticiable. A case
decided by the Court of International Trade just two weeks ago,
The American Association of Exporters and Importers - Textile
and Apparel Group v. United States,23 for example, upheld the
government position on these same grounds. The extent of proper
judicial deference to international trade control actions is, I sug-
gest, another area in which the balance-striking is going to have to
be carefully considered. I think the issues go simply beyond the
provision by the Export Administration Act for almost forty years
of an exemption from APA type judicial review of export control
actions.2 4 A broader concern is what will happen in the courts with
challenges to the exercise of the broad delegation of authority to
the Executive in this field.
I will just finish with a very few direct responses to Art Downey.
He discussed processing time, and I shudder myself over the delays
that often arise in the export control process. But let's maintain
some perspective. I suggest that it is attorneys who may have a
distorted perspective. A week ago I was speaking in Pittsburgh to a
group of business people, the people who are on the line in dealing
with their companies' exports. Although there were plenty of com-
plaints, I saw the perspective differently there. Lawyers hear about
the cases that stick out like a sore thumb in terms of delay: the
novel cases, the tough cases, cases that the system simply cannot
cope with quickly. The shipping and export service managers and
vice-presidents of international affairs, my Pittsburgh audience if
you will, have realized that, more frequently, they are the benefi-
ciaries of so-called front-door licensing that results in an average
turn around time for the issuance of licenses of eighteen working
days. These are cases in which the lawyers do not get involved.
The horror stories of delay illustrate one problem in the system,
which is that at base export control is a political problem which
entails finding the workable balance and getting decisions in the
bureaucracy when there are close cases and tough cases. The eigh-
teen day average does represent a management problem. If there
are not any tough calls to be made, we should do better than eigh-
teen days; perhaps we should even have eliminated, in some cases,
the need for advanced export clearance.
" 583 F. Supp. 591 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 1984).
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